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Abstract
We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions
for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where
each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(logm+log n) pure
strategies. This result induces an N log logN algorithm for computing
an approximate Nash equilibrium in games where the number of ac-
tions is polynomial in the number of players (m = poly(n)), where
N = nmn is the size of the game (the input size).
In addition, we establish an inverse connection between the entropy
of Nash equilibria in the game, and the time it takes to find such an
approximate Nash equilibrium using the random sampling algorithm.
1 Introduction
Sampling from a Nash equilibrium is a well-know method for proving exis-
tence of a simple approximate Nash equilibrium. By the sampling method,
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the (possibly complicated) mixed strategy xi of player i is replaced by k i.i.d.
samples of pure strategies from the distribution xi. These k samples are each
chosen at random with probability 1/k, and together they form a simple k-
uniform strategy si. Equivalently, k-uniform strategies are mixed strategies
that assign to each pure strategy a rational probability with denominator k.
The main advantage of the k-uniform strategy si over the original strategy
xi is that there are at most m
k such strategies (actually
(
m+k−1
k
)
), where m
is the number of actions of player i. Therefore, in the case where we do not
know the original strategy xi (and thus we cannot produce the strategy si
from xi), we can search for the strategy si over a relatively small set of size
mk.
The sampling method has a very important consequence for the compu-
tation of approximate Nash equilibria. If we prove existence of a k-uniform
approximate Nash equilibrium (si)
n
i=1 for small k, then we need only search
exhaustively for an approximate Nash equilibrium over all the possible n-
tuples of k-uniform strategies. Although this method seems naive, it provides
the best upper bound that is known today for computing an approximate
Nash equilibrium.
Althofer [1] was the first to introduce the sampling method, when he stud-
ied two-player zero-sum games and showed existence of k-uniform approxi-
mately optimal strategies with k = O(logm). Althofer [1] also showed that
the order of logm is optimal (for two-player games). Lipton, Markakis, and
Mehta [7] generalized this result to all two-player games; i.e., they proved
existence of a k-uniform approximate Nash equilibrium for k = O(logm).
For n-player games, Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [7] proved existence of
a k-uniform approximate Nash equilibrium for k = O(n2 logm). He´mon,
Rougemont, and Santha [5] simplified it to k = O(n logm).
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In the present paper, we prove existence of a k-uniform approximate Nash
equilibrium for k = O(logn + logm) (see Theorem 1). The results in [7]
and [5] induce a poly(N logN ) algorithm for computing an approximate Nash
equilibrium (see [8]), where N = nmn is the input size. Our result yields
a poly(N log logN) algorithm for games where the number of actions of each
player is polynomial in n (the number of players). To our knowledge, the
best previously known upper bound for this class of games is the poly(N logN)
of [7].
Our second result establishes an inverse connection between the entropy
of Nash equilibria in the game and the time that it takes the sampling method
algorithm to find an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Theorem 2). In par-
ticular, this result generalizes the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4]
on existence of a polynomial algorithm for an approximate Nash equilibrium
in small probability games, which are a sub-class of the games where the
entropy of a Nash equilibrium is very high. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou
[4] proved this result for two-player games. A corollary of our result (see
Corollary 3) is that an appropriate generalization of that statement holds for
any number of players n.
2 The results
We consider n-player games with m-actions for each player.1 The size of the
game is denoted by N := nmn. We use the following standard notation.
The set of players is [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}. The set of actions of each player is
Ai = [m] = {1, 2, ..., m}. The set of strategy profiles is A = [m]n. The payoff
1All the results in the paper hold also for the case where each player has a different
number of actions (i.e., player i has mi actions). For simplicity, we assume throughout
that all players have the same number of actions m.
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function of player i is ui : A → [0, 1]. The payoff function profile is denoted
by u = (ui)i∈[n]. The set of probability distributions over a set B is denoted
by ∆(B). The set of mixed actions of player i is ∆(Ai). The payoff function
can be multilinearly extended to ui : ∆(A)→ [0, 1].
A mixed action profile x = (xi)i∈[n], where xi ∈ ∆(Ai) is an ε-equilibrium
if no player can gain more than ε by a unilateral deviation; i.e., ui(x) ≥
ui(ai, x−i)−ε, for every player i and every action ai ∈ [m], where x−i denotes
the action profile of all players other than i. A 0-equilibrium is called an exact
or Nash equilibrium.
A mixed strategy xi ∈ Ai is called k-uniform if xi(ai) = ci/k, where
ci ∈ Z, for every action ai ∈ Ai. Equivalently, a k-uniform strategy is a
uniform distribution over a multi-set of k pure actions. A strategy profile
x = (xi)i∈[n] will be called k-uniform if every xi is k-uniform.
We use the notation f(x) = poly(g(x)) if there exists a constant c such
that f(x) ≤ g(x)c for large enough x.
2.1 General games
Our Main Theorem states the following:
Theorem 1. Every n-player game with m actions for each player admits a
k-uniform ε-equilibrium for every
k ≥ 8(lnm+ lnn− ln ε+ ln 8)
ε2
.
.
Corollary 1. Let m = poly(n), and let N = nmn be the input size of an
n-player m-action normal-form game. For every constant ε > 0, there exists
an algorithm for computing an ε-equilibrium in poly(N log logN) steps.
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Proof of Corollary 1. The number of all the possible k-uniform profiles is at
most mnk. Note that
mnk = poly(mn logn) = poly((mn)log log(m
n)) = poly(N log logN).
Therefore the exhaustive search algorithm that searches for an ε-equilibrium
over all possible k-uniform profiles finds such an ε-equilibrium after at most
poly(N log logN) iterations.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof uses the sampling method. Let
k ≥ 8(lnm+lnn−ln ε+ln8)
ε2
, and let x = (xi)i∈[n] be an exact equilibrium of the
game u = (ui)i∈[n]. For every player i, we sample k i.i.d. pure strategies
(bij)j∈k according to the distribution xi (b
i
j ∈ Ai). Denote by si the uniform
distribution over the pure actions (bij)j∈k. It is enough to show that with
positive probability the profile (si)i∈[n] forms an ε-equilibrium.
For every player i and strategy j ∈ Ai = [m], we define a set of forbidden
s values:
Ei,j = {s ∈×
l∈[n]
∆(Al) : |ui(j, x−i)− ui(j, s−i)| ≥ ε
2
}.
Note that almost every realization of s is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to x, written s ≪ x; i.e., the event {support(s) ⊂ support(x)} has
probability 1. Therefore, it is sufficient to verify that P(s /∈ ∪i,jEi,j) > 0,
since every strategy profile s≪ x, s /∈ ∪i,jEi,j is an ε-equilibrium, by
ui(ai, s−i) ≤ ui(ai, x−i) + ε
2
≤
∑
b∈Ai
si(b)ui(b, x−i) +
ε
2
≤
∑
b∈Ai
si(b)ui(b, s−i) + ε = ui(s) + ε,
where the second inequality holds because all the strategies in the support
of si are in the support of xi, which contains only best replies to x−i.
5
To show that P(s ∈ ∪i,jEi,j) < 1, it is sufficient to show that P(s ∈
Ei,j) ≤ 1mn because we have mn such events {s ∈ Ei,j}.
Up to this point, the arguments of the proof are similar to [7] and [5].
The estimation of the probability P(s ∈ Ei,j), however, uses more delicate
arguments. Let us estimate P(s ∈ E1,1).
We begin by rewriting the payoff of player 1. For every l ∈ [k], we can
write
u1(1, s−1) =
1
kn−1
∑
j1,j2,...,jn∈[k]
u1(1, b
2
j2+l, b
3j3 + l, ..., b
n
jn+l)
where the indexes ji + l are taken modulo k. If we take the average over all
possible l we have
u1(1, s−1) =
1
kn−1
∑
j1,j2,...,jn∈[k]
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
u1(1, b
2
j2+l, b
3j3 + l, ..., b
n
jn+l). (1)
For every initial profile of indexes j∗ = (j2, j3, ..., jn) ∈ [k]n−1 and every
l ∈ [k], we denote b−1j∗+l := (b2j2+l, b3j3+l, ..., bnjn+l) ∈ A−1, and we define the
random variable
d(j∗) :=


0 if
∣∣∣∣∣
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
u1(1, b
−1
j∗+l
)− u1(1, x−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ε
4
1 otherwise.
(2)
By the definition of d(j∗), we have
d(j∗) +
ε
4
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
u1(1, b
−1
j∗+l
)− u1(1, x−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (3)
Note also that for any fixed j∗ the random action profiles b−1j∗+1, . . . , b
−1
j∗+k
are
independent. Therefore by Hoeffding’s inequality (see [6]) we have
E(d(j∗)) ≤ 2e− kε
2
8 . (4)
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Using representation (1) of the payoffs and inequalities (3) and (4), we get
P(s ∈ E1,1) = P


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
kn−1
∑
j∗∈[k]n−1
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
u1(1, b
−1
j∗+l
)− u1(1, x−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ ε
2


≤ P

 1
kn−1
∑
j∗∈[k]n−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
u1(1, b
−1
j∗+l
)− u1(1, x−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ ε
2


≤ P

 1
kn−1
∑
j∗∈[k]n−1
d(j∗) ≥ ε
4

 ≤ 8e
− kε2
8
ε
(5)
where the last inequality follows from Markov’s inequality. Putting k ≥
8(lnm+lnn−ln ε+ln8)
ε2
in inequality (5), we get P(E1,1) ≤ 1mn .
2.2 Games with a high-entropy equilibrium
In the sequel it will be convenient to consider the set of k-uniform strategies
as the set of ordered k-tuples of pure actions. To avoid ambiguity we will call
those strategies k-uniform ordered strategies.2 Now the number of k-uniform
ordered profiles is exactly mnk.
The algorithm of Corollary 1 suggests that we should search over all the
possible k-uniform profiles (or k-uniform ordered profiles), one by one, until
we find an approximate equilibrium. Consider now the case where a large
fraction of the k-uniform ordered strategies form an approximate equilibrium,
say a fraction of 1/r. In such a case we can pick k-uniform ordered profiles
at random, and then we will find the approximate equilibrium in expected
time r.
Define the k-uniform random sampling algorithm (k-URS) to be the al-
gorithm described above; i.e., it samples uniformly at random n-tuples of
2Many k-uniform ordered strategies correspond to the same mixed strategy of the player
in the game.
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k-uniform ordered strategies and checks whether this profile forms an ε-
equilibrium.3
An interesting question arises: For which games does the k-URS algo-
rithm find an approximate equilibrium fast? Daskalakis and Papadimitriou
[4] focused on two-player games with m actions, and they showed that the
k-URS algorithm finds an approximate equilibrium after poly(m) samples for
small-probability games. A small-probability game is a game that admits a
Nash equilibrium where each pure action is played with probability at most
c/m for some constant c.
Here we generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou to n-player
games. Instead of focusing on the specific class of small-probability games
we establish a general connection between the entropy of equilibria in the
game and the expected number of samples of the k-URS algorithm until an
approximate Nash equilibrium is found.
Theorem 2. Let u be an n-player game with m actions for each player, with
a Nash equilibrium x = (xi). Let k ≥ max{16ε2 (lnn+lnm− ln ε+2), e16/ε
2} =
O(logm+ logn); then the k-uniform random sampling algorithm finds an ε-
equilibrium after at most 4 · 2k(n log2 m−H(x)) samples in expectation, where
H(x) is Shannon’s entropy of the Nash equilibrium x.
The following corollary of this theorem is straightforward.
Corollary 2. Families of games where n log2m−max
x∈NE
H(x) is bounded ad-
mit a poly(m,n) probabilistic algorithm for computing an approximate Nash
equilibrium.
3Checking whether a strategy profile forms an approximate equilibrium can always be
done in poly(N) time. Actually, it can even be done by using only poly(n,m) samples
from the mixed profile. Using the samples, the answer will be correct with a probability
that is exponential (in n and m) close to 1 (see, e.g., [3], proof of Theorem 2).
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The corollary follows from the fact that k = O(logm+ logn), and there-
fore 4 · 2kO(1) = poly(n,m).
A special case where n log2m−H(x) is constant is that of small-probability
games with a constant number of players n.
Corollary 3. Let c ≥ 1, and let u be an n-player m-action game with a
Nash equilibrium x = (xi)i∈[n], where xi(ai) ≤ cm for players i and all actions
ai ∈ Ai. Let k = O(logm), as defined in Theorem 2. Then the expected
number of samples of the k-URS algorithm is at most 4 · 2kn log c = poly(m).
The corollary follows from the fact that the entropy of the Nash equilib-
rium x is H(x) =
∑
i∈[n]H(xi) ≥ n(log2m− log2 c).
The following example demonstrates that even in the case of two-player
games, the class of games that have PTAS according to Corollary 2 is slightly
wider than the class of small-probability games.
Example 1. Consider a two-player m-action game where the equilibrium
is x = (x1, x2), where x1 is the uniform distribution over all actions x1 =
( 1
m
, 1
m
, ..., 1
m
), and x2 = (
1√
m
, 1
m+
√
m
, 1
m+
√
m
, ..., 1
m+
√
m
). This game is not a
small-probability game, but it does satisfy n log2m−H(x) = o(1):
2 log2m−H(x) ≤ log2m−
m− 1
m+
√
m
log2(m+
√
m)
≤ 1√
m+ 1
logm = o(1).
In the proof of Theorem 2 we use the following lemma from information
theory.
Lemma 1. Let y be a random variable that assumes values in a finite set
M . Let S ⊂M such that P(y ∈ S) ≥ 1− 1
log2 |M | ; then |S| ≥
1
4
2H(y).
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Proof.
H(y) = P(y ∈ S)H(y|y ∈ S) + P(y /∈ S)H(y|y /∈ S) +H(1{y∈S})
≤ log2 |S|+ P(y /∈ S) log2 |M | + 1 ≤ log2 |S|+ 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that k ≥ max{16
ε2
(lnn + lnm − ln ε + 2), e16/ε2}
guarantees that
8e−
kε
2
8
ε
≤ 1
mn
1
nklog2m
.
By considering inequality (5) in the proof of Theorem 1, we can see that
the above choice of k implies that P(E1,1) ≤ 1mn 1nk log2 m , which implies that
P(s ∈ ∪i,jEi,j) ≤ 1nk log2 m . This means that if we sample k-uniform ordered
strategy profiles according to the Nash equilibrium x, then the resulting k-
uniform ordered strategies form an ε-equilibrium with a probability of at
least 1− 1
nk log2 m
= 1− 1
log2(m
nk)
.
Next, using Lemma 1, we provide a lower bound on the number of k-
uniform profiles that form an ε-equilibrium. The random k-uniform profiles
are elements of a set of sizemnk. The entropy of the random k-uniform profile
is kH(x). The probability that the random profile will form an ε-equilibrium
is at least 1 − 1
log2(m
nk)
. Therefore, by Lemma 1, we get that there are at
least 1
4
2kH(x) different k-uniform profiles that are ε-equilibria.
To conclude, the fraction of the k-uniform profiles that form an ε-equilibrium
(among all the k-uniform profiles) is at least:
1
4
2kH(x)
mnk
=
1
4
2k(H(x)−n log2 m).
Therefore, the expected time for finding an ε-equilibrium is at most 4 ·
2k(n log2 m−H(x)).
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3 Discussion
Having established an upper bound of O(logm + logn), it is natural to ask
whether it is tight. Althofer [1] provided a lower bound of the order logm
that matches our upper bound in the case where the number of players is
not much larger than the number of pure strategies; i.e., n = poly(m). In
general, the tightness of our upper bound remains an open question. A
similar question regarding the existence of pure approximate equilibria in
Lipschitz games with many players arose in a related work by Azrieli and
Shmaya [2].
Let us call games with n players, m actions for each player, and payoffs
in [0, 1], normalized n-player m-action games. To pinpoint the limits of our
understanding of the problem, consider the following questions.
Question 1. Is there a function k : (0, 1)→ N (k dependents on ε only, and
not on the number of players n), such that every normalized n-player two-
action game admits an ε-equilibrium in which every player employs a mixed
strategy whose coefficients are rational numbers with a denominator at most
k(ε)?
Question 2. Is there an ε > 0 and a constant C > 0, such that for every
n,m ∈ N there exists a normalized n-player m-action game that does not
admit any ε-equilibrium in which every player employs a mixed strategy
whose coefficients are rational numbers with a denominator at most C(logn+
logm)?
Note that a positive answer to Question 2 means that our upper bound is
tight, whereas a positive answer to Question 1 implies that our upper bound
is not tight. A positive answer to Question 1 means that one can find a
k-uniform approximate equilibrium of the game for a constant k (depending
11
only on ε), which in particular implies that there exists a poly(N) algorithm
for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-action games.
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